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MONTANA LAW REVIEW
A GUIDE FOR MORE EFFICIENT LAW ENFORCEMENT
This Note was written in an attempt to establish a guide for Montana
attorneys and law enforcement officers to the legal procedures which must
be observed when obtaining evidence against an accused. In the past
numerous prosecutions have failed because crucial evidence was rejected,
yet convictions migh have been obtained had the officers been aware when
gathering evidence that it would be unavailable on trial of the accused
unless properly obtained. Not only is improperly obtained evidence often
inadmissible, but in addition officers may be subject to civil and criminal
liability.
If society is to be adequately protected against modern crime syndicates
and widespread criminal activities, the officers must be informed as to the
constitutional and statutory limitations which must be observed. These
are necessary safeguards, established as a bulwark against the transgression
of personal liberties; and they should not be limited through the actions of
pressure groups which maintain that crime cannot be suppressed because
the police powers are too closely shackled by so called "legal technicalities."
This Note is a summary of the Montana constitutional provisions, statutory
enactments, and decisions which affect the admissibility of evidence ob-
tained as a result of confessions, search and seizure, blood tests and wire
tapping. In formulating this guide, decisions from other jurisdictions have
been incorporated in the absence of applicable Montana decisions on the
subject.
CONFESSIONS
A confession is a statement by a person that he committed or partici.
pated in the commission of a crime made at any time after the crime.' This
is to be distinguished from an admission which is a "statement by the ac-
cused, direct or implied, of' facts pertinent to the issue, and tending, in con-
nection with proof of other facts, to prove his guilt, but of itself is insuf-
ficient to authorize a conviction."
Confession Must Be Voluntary
Before a confession will be admissible as evidence in a criminal pro-
ceeding it must be shown that it was voluntarily given. This means that
the state must establish that the law enforcement officers obtained the con-
fession from the accused without the use of physical threats, coercion, duress,
or undue restraint.' An admission on the other hand, need not be proved
to be voluntary before it is admissible.'
A showing of the voluntary character of a confession is required, not
to exclude the truth, but to avoid the possibility of a false confession by one
who is in fact innocent.' Not only is an involuntary confession inherently
untrustworthy," but its admission into evidence against the accused may
amount to a denial of due process because it offends the community's funda-
mental sense of justice and fair play.' This may be so even though the
'State v. Guie, 56 Mont. 485, 186 Pac. 329 (1919).
2State v. Stevens, 60 Mont. 390, 402, 199 Pac. 256, 259 (1921).
'Territory v. McClin, 1 Mont. 394 (1871).'State v. Stevens, 60 Mont. 390, 199 Pac. 256 (1921).
'State v. Dixson, 80 Mont. 181, 260 Pac. 138 (1927).
'State v. Guie, 56 Mont. 485, 186 Pac. 329 (1919).
'Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
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state courts have previously declared it to be voluntary, since the Supreme
Court will make an independent finding of the facts in determining wheth-
er or not a confession was obtained in violation of the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment
The Montana courts, in determining whether a confession is voluntary,
use the following test: "Was the inducement held out to the accused such
as that there is any fair risk of false confession?" In other words, was the
confession prompted by some inducement, threat or promise under circum-
stances showing that the confessor, as a reasonable person, might prefer to
speak falsely rather than remain silent?' Each case must be judged on its
own particular facts and circumstances," and it is a question of law for the
courts in the first instance to determine if the confession is voluntary.'
No Duty to Caution Accused of Right to Remain Silent
A number of decisions have further clarified the rules indicating when
a confession will be deemed voluntary under the Montana test and the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Where a confession is made
while the accused is under arrest or in cutsody of an officer, such fact alone
will not void an otherwise valid confession.' Likewise a police officer is
ordinarily under no duty to caution the accused to the effect that "any-
thing you say may be held against you." Some jurisdictions recommend
that the confessor be warned of his right to remain silent.' The Montana
court in State v. Robuck" suggested that such might be the rule in Montana,
but did not decide the question. To safeguard admissibility of the confes-
sion, therefore, the officer probably should advise the accused of his right
to remain silent.
Confession May Be Oral or Written
A confession may be oral or written, but the latter is preferable because
of the greater evidentiary value which the jury will ultimately attach to it.
It may be in the handwriting of the confessor and signed by him, or his oral
confession can be taken down in writing by another and read back to the
accused. If he signs and adopts it as his own it will then be a valid written
confession." Some jurisdictions hold that an oral confession is admissible
when transcribed by another on behalf of the accused, and is thereafter read
and acknowledged, even though he does not sign it.' It is good procedure
for police officers to incorporate in the confession a statement that "This
confession is made voluntarily, of my own free will, and is not prompted by
any promises of leniency or reward."
In Montana a confession otherwise admissible, is not vitiated because
made in the absence of counsel."
OChambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940).
'State v. Sherman, 35 Mont. 512, 90 Pac. 981 (1907).
"State v. Dixson, 80 Mont. 181, 260 Pac. 138 (1927).
"State v. Sherman, 35 Mont. 512, 90 Pac. 981 (1907).
'State v. Dixson, 80 Mont. 181, 260 Pac. 138 (1927).
"sReagen v. Colorado, 49 Colo. 316, 112 Pac. 785 (1911); State v. Ellington, 4 Idaho
529, 43 Pac. 60 (1895).
"126 Mont. 302, 248 P.2d 817 (1952).
'State v. Berberick, 38 Mont. 423, 100 Pac. 209 (1909).
"State v. Harris, 74 Wash. 60, 132 Pac. 735 (1913).
"State v. Robuck, 126 Mont. 302, 284 P.2d 817 (1952).
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Mere Admonishment Will Not Vitiate Confession
A mere admonishment to speak the truth, unconnected with promises
of leniency, threats, or physical harm made by the person receiving the con-
fession will not vitiate the confession. It is very important, however, that
the police officers do not make statements to the confessor which will induce
him to make a false confession. In State v. Dixson' the court held that
statements by an officer that "if a person told the truth, as a rule, he got
out of it a whole lot easier than he would by telling a lot of lies," and that
"if he would come clean chances are it would be easier with him," were
held not to render the confession involuntary. The court also approved the
adjuration that it would be better for him "to confess or tell the truth."
A confession was held to be involuntary when the arresting officer informed
the accused that it would be better for him to go back and tell the authorities
all about it; that he thought they would be as lenient as possible if he would
give evidence against the other two.'
Artifice or deception will not of itself render a confesion involuntary
but either will make it more difficult to lay the necessary foundation. In
State v. Robuck, ' the police officers informed the defendant's accomplice
that it would probably help the defendant if she were to confess, and the
accomplice thereafter told the accused, in absence of the officers, "that it
would probably go a little easier on her if she did." These statements did
not render the confession involuntary since the accused had been previously
informed of her right to counsel and of her right to remain silent. But the
use of deception in State v. Rossell' was held to vitiate the confession. There
the defendant relied upon false statements and, thinking his defense to the
crime was lost, confessed.
Confessions Involving Promises or Inducements and Threats
Promises or inducements by police officers which raise any hope of
leniency or reward ordinarily will create such a risk of a false confession
that the courts unhesitatingly declare such a confession void.' A confession
was held to be inadmissible in State v. Duran' when the county attorney
told the accused he would drop a prior charge if the accused would confess.
Montana law requires that the invalidating inducements or promises be
made by the public prosecutor, magistrate, arresting officer, one having
custody of the defendant, or by a private person in the presence of an offi-
cer so as to give the accused reasonable grounds to believe that the promises
will be fulfilled.' State v. Shermae held that promises made to the de-
fendant by his father were sufficient to invalidate the confession because
the accused could reasonably believe that the officers sanctioned the in-
ducement made by a third party in their presence.
Threats of physical violence to the person of the accused will vitiate a
180 Mont. 181, 260 Pac. 138 (1927).
"Territory v. Underwood, 8 Mont. 131, 19 Pac. 398 (1888).
2126 Mont. 302, 248 P.2d 817 (1952).
21113 Mont. 457, 127 P.2d 379 (1942).
'People v. Heide, 302 Ill. 624, 135 N.E. 77 (1922).
2127 Mont. 233, 259 P.2d 1051 (1953).
2'Territory v. MeClin, 1 Mont. 354 (1871).
'535 Mont. 512, 90 Pac. 981 (1907).
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confession if there is "a fair risk of false confession" as determined by the
court." Section 94-3918" provides:
It shall be unlawful for any sheriff, constable, police officer, or
any persons charged with the custody of any one accused of crime,
of whatever nature, or with the violation of a municipal ordinance,
to frighten or attempt to frighten by threats, torture, or attempt
to torture, or resort to any means of an inhuman nature, or prac-
tice what is commonly known as the "third degree" in order to
secure a confession from such person.
Questioning of Accused
Short of threats and torture, the permisible limits beyond which law
enforcement officers may not go in questioning of the accused are not well
defined. The only definite rule in Montana seems to be that the question-
ing cannot be so persistent and continuous as to fall within the fair risk of
false confession test. The questioning can be harsh and vigorous" and some
courts permit the questioning to be accompanied by abusive language.
Prolonged questioning considered in light of the circumstances under which
it was conducted may vitiate the confession especially if the interrogation
is carried to a point of exhaustion.' Interrogation may be extended over a
considerable period of time if the questioning is reasonable and the comfort
and well-being of the defendant is taken into consideration by the interroga-
tors.'
Unreasonable Delay in Arraignment
The Montana court has not been confronted with! the question of
whether a confession should be declared involuntary because it was obtained
after an unreasonable delay in taking the accused before a magistrate in
contravention of law. Section 94-3916 provides:
Every public officer or other person, having arrested any person
upon a criminal charge, who wilfully delays to take such person
before a magistrate having jurisdiction, to take his examination, is
guilty of a misdemeanor.
One Utah decision has held that a confession is not vitiated merely because
it is taken during the delay in arraignment.' The federal courts follow the
rule of McNabb v. United States' which held that confessions obtained dur-
ing a period of unreasonable detention and delay are void. However, in
Mitchell v. United States"M a confession obtained without coercion immedi-
ately after the accused was brought to the police station was held admissible
even though the defendant was illegally held eight days thereafter. The
McNabb case was distinguished in that there coercive methods had been
employed in obtaining the confession. Upshaw v. United States? reaffirmed
'State v. Dixson, 80 Mont. 181, 260 Pac. 138 (1927).
MAll section numbers in the text refer to the REvIsED CODES OF MONTANA, 1947, un-
less noted otherwise.
"People v. Nelson, 320 Ill. 273, 150 N.E. 686 (1926).
'Buschy v. People, 73 Colo. 472, 216 Pac. 519 (1903).
'OBruner v. People, 113 Colo. 194, 156 P.2d 111 (1945).
"t Walker v. People, 126 Colo. 135, 248 P.2d 287 (1952) ; People v. Curley, 114 Cal.
App. 2d 577, 250 P.2d 667 (1952).
'2State v. Gardner, 119 Utah 579, 230 P.2d 559 (1951).
m318 U.S. 332 (1943).
"322 U.S. 65 (1944).
35 U.S. 410 (1948).
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MONTANA LAW REVIEW
the rule of the McNabb case by declaring a confession void because it was
obtained after the period of a reasonable delay had elapsed, even though
no coercion was applied. This is a rule of federal policy, not one required
by the Constitution. The states are not obliged to follow it.
Psychologically Coerced Confessions Are Inadmissible
Confessions are inadmissible when the confessor is insane or incapable
of using his mental faculties to a degree enabling him to fully comprehend
the effect of his confessions.' In State v. Berberick' the defense offered to
prove that the defendant was "weak-minded" at the time the confession
was made, but the court'declined this offer. On appeal to the Supreme
Court of Montana it was determined that the accused should have been
granted an opportunity to introduce testimony as to his mental condition
before the confession was admitted into evidence. The court stated that
the accused in making a confession must have the degree of competency re-
quired of a witness by section 93-701-3. A confession made by an unedu-
cated Negro of low mentality, when he was isolated for a week, removed
to a state prison far from his home and questioned reasonably for five days,
was held in Fikes v. Alabaman ' to be obtained by the state officers in viola-
tion of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. This is an ex-
treme case of psychological coercion but it illustrates the degree of care re-
quired by the law enforcement officers in obtaining voluntary confessions.
SEARCH AND SEIZURE
In their quest for evidence upon which a conviction can be based, law
enforcement officers have been repeated violators of the rights protected
by our Constitution. As a result of these unlawful searches and seizures
and the unavailability of the evidence obtained by them, the guilty have
been set free and the public has been subjected to unnecessary expense in
retrying cases. In addition innocent people have been the subject of un-
justified invasions of privacy causing them to become indignant and unco-
operative with the police.
The right of the people to be free from unreasonable searches and seiz-
ures is guaranteed by the fourth amendmente to the Constitution of the
United States and by article III, section 7, of the Constitution of Montana.
The Montana provision reads as follows:
The people shall be secure in their persons, papers, homes, and ef-
fects, from unreasonable searches and seizures, and no warrant to
search any place or seize any person or thing shall issue without
describing the place to be searched, or the person or thing to be
seized, nor without probable cause, supported by oath or affirma-
tion, reduced to writing.
Is evidence obtained by an unlawful search and seizure admissible. on
trial of -the accused? This question should be of vital concern to a law en-
forcement officer in view of the fact that Montana' follows the federal ex-
"Reed v. People, 122 Colo. 308, 221 P.2d 1070 (1950).
'738 Mont. 423, 100 Pac. 209 (1909).
'77 Sup. Ct. 281 (1957).
"The right of people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and. seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation."
'0State v. Fuller, 34 Mont. 12, 89 Pac. 369 (1906).
(Vol. 18,
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clusionary rule as enunciated in the case of Weeks v. United States." This
judicially created rule provides that evidence obtained in violation of the
constitutional prohibition against unreasonable search and seizure is inad-
missible in federal proceedings. It was clearly established in Wolf v. Colo-
rado,' however, that the federal exclusionary rule is not based upon the
fourth or fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution. In
that case the Court ruled that the states are free to adopt their own policy
as to evidence illegally obtained as the result of an unreasonable search
and seizure. As previously stated, Montana has decided to follow the ex-
clusionary rule of the federal courts."
Subjects afforded constitutional protection include the individual's
person, home, effects and papers. Cases interpreting the first of these sub-
jects have declared that the protection extends to an arrest of an individual,"
although there is contrary authority. ' It would seem that a person should
logically be entitled to constitutional protection against unwarranted arrest
at least equal the protection afforded to his home, effects and papers. The
word "home" means dwelling place and has been interpreted to include
curtilage," but an open field or roadway has been held not within the scope
of that term.' "Effects," as set forth in the Constitution, means personal
belongings" such as baggage and clothing." Books, papers and documents
should clearly come within this constitutional protection.
Waiver of Constitutional Rights
One consenting to an unreasonable search and seizure cannot later be
heard to object to evidence acquired in the course thereof.' Such consent
was manifested in the case of State ex rel. Muzzy v. Uotila" where the
sheriff, having heard that the defendant was violating the liquor laws, in-
formed the defendant that he "wanted to look it over" and the defendant
replied, "All right go ahead." This was held to be a waiver of his con-
stitutional right of protection against an unreasonable search and seizure.
It has elsewhere been said that the waiver must be intelligently and volun-
tarily made by the accused after he has been informed of his rights." The
Oklahoma Supreme Court has held that an accused's statement, "No, go
ahead look around," in reply to the officer's question whether he objected
to a search of the premises did not constitute a waiver because the officer
had manifested an intent to search the premises without a warrant."
"232 U.S. 383 (1914).
"338 U.S. 25 (1949). See infra p. 228.
"State v. Fuller, 34 Mont. 12, 85 Pac. 369 (1906) ; State ex rel. Samlin v. District
Court, 59 Mont. 600, 198 Pac. 362 (1921).
"State ex rel. Wong You v. District Court, 106 Mont. 347, 77 P.2d 353 (1938) ; State
v. Mullaney, 92 Mont. 553, 16 P.2d 407 (1932) ; State ex rel. Neville v. Mullen, 63
Mont. 50, 207 Pac. 634 (1922) ; State ex rel. Nolan v. Brantley, 20 Mont. 173, 178,
50 Pac. 410, 411 (1897).
"State v. Hum Quock, 89 Mont. 503, 300 Pac. 220 (1931) (see strong dissent by Jus-
tices Galen and Ford).
"Ratzell v. State, 270 Okla. Crim. 340, 228 Pac. 166 (1924).
"State v. Arnold, 84 Mont. 348, 358, 275 Pac. 757, 759 (1929) ; State v. Ladue, 73
Mont. 535, 237 Pac. 495 (1925).
"State v. Mullaney, 92 Mont. 553, 16 P.2d 407 (1932).
"State v. Hum Quock, 89 Mont. 503, 300 Pac. 220 (1931).
'State v. Fuller, 34 Mont. 12, 85 Pac. 369 (1906).
5'71 Mont. 351, 229 Pac. 724 (1924).
'State v. Allison, 116 Mont. 352, 153 P.2d 141 (1944).
"Helfer v. State, 84 Okla. Crim. 304, 181 P.2d 862 (1947) ; Dawson v. State, 83 Okla.
Crim, 263, 175 P.2d 368 (1946).
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Search and Seizure Under a Search Warrant
Search warrants were instituted for the purpose of establishing legal
safeguards against unlawful searches and seizures. They supplanted the
general warrants issued in colonial times in the form of writs of assistance."
The legislature of Montana in furtherance of the constitutional provision
enacted statutes specifying the conditions upon which a search warrant
could issue. Although the search warrant has long been recognized as es-
sential to effective enforcement of the law, it has from time immemorial
been cautiously framed and carefully pursued because of its arbitrary char-
acter. The law has always construed a search warrant very strictly and re-
quired that it conform in every particular to the exact terms of the statutes.
Officers conducting searches under the authority of the warrant have like-
'Wise been held to strict accountability.' A search warrant may issue only
in furtherance of public prosecution and not private litigation.'
Section 94-301-2 enumerates the following grounds upon which a search
warrant may be issued: (1) for property which has been stolen or em-
bezzled, (2) for property which has been used to commit a felony, (3) for
property in possession of one intending to use it for committing a public of-
fense, or in possession of another to whom he may have delivered it for the
purpose of concealing it or preventing its discovery. It is, therefore, self
evident that a search warrant may not be procured for the single purpose
of conducting a "fishing expedition" to obtain evidence.' Section 94-301-3
provides:
A search warrant cannot be issued but upon probable cause, sup-
ported by affidavit, naming or describing the person, and par-
ticularly describing the property and the place to be searched.
Before a warrant may issue, the application must set forth sufficient facts
for the judicial officer to ascertain whether or not probable cause exists.
Scope of the Search Warrant
A search conducted outside the scope of the search warrant will be held
to violate the Constitution. This means that there must not be any uncer-
tainty or obscurity as to the premises to be searched or the property to be
seized. The officer requesting a warrant must be certain that he gives a
complete description of the place, the particular dwelling house, and the
property to be seized, in order to establish without question the scope of the
contemplated search. As illustrated in State ex rel. King v. District Court,'
a search warrant containing the legal description "the dwelling house and
all outbuildings" was held to be void because it failed to state specifically
whose dwelling house or which of several sheds was to be included in the
search. "The warrant must point unerringly to the object of the search,"
and not leave the law enforcement officer any discretion as to its extent.
That warrant authorized search and seizure of "intoxicating liquor, ves-
sels, furniture, and implements used in making it." Seizure of sugar there-
under was unlawful because it was not accurately described in the warrant.
"Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
'State ex rel. King v. District Court, 70 Mont. 191, 224 Pac. 862 (1924).
"Id. at 197, 224 Pac. at 864.
OState ex rel. Thibodeau v. District Court, 70 Mont. 202, 224 Pac. 866 (1924).
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A variance between the search warrant as issued by the magistrate and
the return by the sheriff concerning the property seized or the premises
searched (e.g., 906 A. Street instead of 609 A Street) will also vitiate the
warrant. This error cannot be corrected by amending the return to read
"as described in the search warrant. "'
Contraband property, although seized under a void search warrant,
will not be returned to the owner because this property is of such a nature
that a person has no right to possession.' However, this does not mean that
the defendant cannot object to the use of the contraband property against
him on his trial.' A search unlawful in its inception will not become lawful
by what is later found even though the articles are contraband or weapons
used to commit a crime.' Section 94-301-11 requires:
The magistrate must insert a direction in the warrant that it be
served in the daytime, unless the affidavits are positive that the
property is on the person or in the place to be searched, in which
case he may insert a direction that it be served at any time of the
day or night.
Search Incident to an Arrest
It is well settled that a search and seizure conducted without a search
warrant, but as incident to a lawful arrest, is justifiable if reasonable in
scope." An arrest has been defined in State ex rel. Sadler v. District
Court" as the "taking, seizing or detaining of the person of another either
by touching, or putting hands on him, or by any act which indicates an in-
tention to take him into custody and subject the person of the accused to
the actual control and will of the person making the arrest." An arrest pur-
suant to a warrant' is clearly lawful. Problems concerning the validity of
the arrest and hence the reasonableness of the search may arise, however,
when a police officer makes an arrest without a warrant as prescribed in
section 94-6003. This statute provides:
A peace officer . .. may, without a warrant, arrest a person-
(1) For a public offense committed or attempted in his presence;
(2), When a person arrested has committed a felony, although not
in his presence; (3) When a felony has in fact been committed, and
he has reasonable cause for believing the person arrested to have
committed it; (4) On a charge made, upon a reasonable cause, of
the commission of a felony by the party arrested; (5) At night,
"State ex rel. Thibodeau v. District Court, 70 Mont. 202, 210, 224 Pac. 866, 870
(1924) ; State v. Malarky, 57 Mont. 132, 187 Pac. 635 (1920).'State ex rel. King v. District Court, 70 Mont. 191, 224 Pac. 862 (1924).
a'State em rel. Thibodeau v. District Court, 70 Mont. 202, 224 Pac. 866 (1924) ; Allen
v. Holbrook, 103 Utah 319, 135 P.2d 242 (1943) (A general description of contra-
band or goods of an illicit character is sufficient, whereas a particular description
is necessary when seizing ordinary chattels).
'State ex rel. King v. District Court, 70 Mont. 191, 198, 200, 224 Pac. 862, 865 (1924);
State v. Hum Quock, 89 Mont. 503, 300 Pac. 220 (1931) (Legality of an arrest
cannot depend upon what is found on the person of the accused, but the property
found may have a bearing on the good faith of the belief of the arresting officer.)
OEState ex rel. Sadler v. District Court, 70 Mont. 378, 225 Pac. 1000 (1924). See
RLC.M. 1947, § 94-5901 to 94-5918.
"'70 Mont. 378, 225 Pac. 1000 (1924) ; State v. Bradshaw, 53 Mont. 96, 161 Pac. 710
(1916) ; R.C.M. 1947, § 94-6008.
-R.C.M. 1947, §§ 94-5901 to 94-5918.
68For a detailed analysis see Mason, Arrest8 Without a Warrant in Montana, 11 MoN-
TANA L. RDv. 1 (1950).
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when there is reasonable cause to believe that he has committed a
felony.
These constitute the officer's authority to arrest. Including this there are
said to be four requisites for a lawful arrest: " [1] a purpose to take the
person into custody; [2] under a real ... authority; [3] an actual or con-
structive seizure or detention of his person; [4] so understood by the person
arrested.'
"Probable Cause" Must Preexist
"Probable cause" or "reasonable cause to believe" ' is a necessary but
nebulous element of all arrests with the exception of subsection 2 of section
94-6003. In determining whether or not "probable cause" exists the facts
and circumstances of each case must be considered. Although subsection 1
of section 94-6003 does not expressly require a finding of "probable cause,"
the court in State ex rel. Neville v. Mullen' held that, for a misdemeanor,
before a valid arrest without a warrant can be consummated, the circum-
stances must be such that a warrant could be obtained. When "probable
cause" is found to exist prior to or contemporaneous with the arrest, a
search and seizure otherwise reasonable as incident thereto will be held to
be within the constitutional safeguards." But a search and seizure which is
based upon mere suspicion and not upon "reasonable cause to believe" is
void.' Subsection 2 of section 94-6003 authorizes the arrest of one in fact
a felon although the felony was not committed in the presence of the ar-
resting officer, thus eliminating the need for "probable cause." The court
apparently overlooked this statute in the case of State v. Mullaney" when it
held that the arrest and search and seizure of the defendant in fact guilty
of illegally possessing narcotics (a felony) was void because the arresting
officer did not have "probable cause" for believing the defendant guilty at
the time of the arrest. Mere suspicion based upon proof of general reputa-
tion does not constitute "probable cause."
The search and seizure must be conducted contemporaneously with or
'State ex rel. Sadler v. District Court, 70 Mont. 378, 386, 225 Pac. 1000, 1001 (1924).
There can be no arrest when arrestee is not conscious of his liberty being restrained
and mere submission, whether pretended or real, will not constitute an arrest if the
arrestee Is not within the control of the person arresting. Harrer v. Montgomery
Ward and Co., 124 Mont. 295, 221 P.2d 428 (1950).
"Various definitions of probable cause found In Montana decisions are as follows:
"Probable cause is the knowledge of the facts, actual or apparent, strong enough to
justify a reasonable man in the belief that he has lawful grounds for prosecuting
the defendant in the manner complained of." State ex rel. Neville v. Mullen, 63
Mont. 50, 58, 207 Pac. 634, 637 (1922). "In other words, If the circumstances are
such that the officer could properly secure a warrant of arrest, he may arrest with-
out a warrant if the offense which the circumstances tend to establish was com-
mitted In his presence; and it is settled in this jurisdiction that the officer need not
have actual, personal knowledge of the facts which constitute the offense in order
to be able to make complaint and secure a warrant." Id. at 58, 207 Pac. at 636.
"An arrest without a warrant, and likewise a search and seizure without a warrant,
Is illegal and, therefore, unreasonable when It Is made upon mere suspicion or be-
lief unsupported by facts, circumstances, or credible Information calculated to pro-
duce such belief." State ex rel. Sadler v. District Court, 106 Mont. 347, 354, 78 P.2d
353,355 (1938).
663 Mont. 50, 207 Pac. 634 (1922).
"State v. Hum Quock, 89 Mont. 503, 300 Pac. 220 (1931).
"State ex rel. Sadler v. District Court, 70 Mont..378, 225 Pac. 1000 (1924).
"92 Mont. 553, 16 P.2d 407 (1932).
[Vol. 18,
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19571 NOTES
subsequent to the arrest but not prior thereto.'7 The time lapse between
the arrest and the search must not be too great or the search will not be con-
sidered incident to a lawful arrest. The arresting officer is authorized to
take possession of any articles which may reasonably be of use at the trial,
4
including instrumentalities used in the commission of a crime'M or even mere
evidence which could not be taken under a search warrant.
The decision of State v. Reed' further illustrates the broad scope of
permissible search and seizure as incident to a lawful arrest. In that case
the accused was arrested and a search of his person disclosed a set of keys
which the officers took and used to obtain access 'to his private papers. Let-
ters obtained in the search were held admissible because taken as incident to
a lawful arrest. The court did not indicate where the arrest took place.
However, the general rule does not permit an unrestrained search by law
enforcement officers but limits the search to the person of the arrestee and
his immediate surroundings." Apparently search of a dwelling house is
permissible only when the arrest is made therein.' It should again he noted
that it is only the unreasonable searches and seizures by officers which are
declared to be in violation of the constitutional prohibition." What con-
stitutes a search of the "immediate surroundings" seems to be a judicial
question which has to be decided according to the facts and circumstances
of each individual case.' The federal courts have adopted the "rule of rea-
sonableness" as the only limitation upon searches and seizures conducted
as incident to an arrest.'
It appears somewhat inconsistent to permit such a broad and unlimited
search and seizure power in our law enforcement officers when they con-
duct a search as incident to a lawful arrest yet at the same time greatly limit
search and seizure under a search warrant. The latter is conducted under
judicial supervision according to established legislative enactments but can-
not be used to search for or seize mere evidence for use on trial of the ac-
"Papani v. United States, 84 F.2d 160 (9th Cir. 1936); Walker v. State, 89 Okla.
Crim. 66, 205 P.2d 335 (1949).
"State v. Hum Quock, 89 Mont. 503, 300 Pac. 220 (1931); State ea rel. Kuhr v. Dis-
trict Court, 82 Mont. 515, 268 Pac. 501 (1928).
'5State v. Benson, 91 Mont. 21, 5 P.2d 223 (1931) ; State v. Ladue, 73 Mont. 5,35, 237
Pac. 495 (1925) ; State v. Fuller, 34 Mont. 12, 85 Pac. 369 (1906), citing State v.
Edwards, 51 W. Va. 220, 41 S.E. 429 (1902), to the effect that "there is such a
thing as unreasonable search, which the law will not permit, but where a person
stands charged with a crime, and an instrument or device is found on his person or
in his possession which was a part of the means by which he accomplished the
crime, those instruments, devices, or tokens are legitimate evidence for the state
and may be taken from him and used for that purpose."
"53 Mont. 292, 163 Pac. 477 (1917).
"Wallace v. State, 42 Okla. Crim. 143, 275 Pac. 354 (1929).
"8Ibid.: State v. Neidamire, 98 Mont. 124, 37 P.2d 670 (1934).
'State v. Ladue, 73 Mont. 535, 237 Pac. 495 (1925).t Phillip v. State, 95 Okla. Crim. 336, 245 P.2d 129 (1952). Search of defendant's
motel was permitted as incident to an arrest. State eo rel. Fong v. Superior Court,
29 Wash. 2d 601, 188 P.2d 125 (1948). Search and seizure was held to be reasonable
where officers conducted a search of a room which was used in defendant's busi-
ness; reasonableness of a search Is not determined by any fixed standard but must
be looked at in light of the facts and circumstances of each particular case. United
States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950).
sKremen v. United States, 231 F.2d 155 (9th Cir. 1956), cert. granted 77 Sup. Ct. 46,
stretches to the limit the rule of reasonableness laid down in Harris v. United
States, 331 U.S. 145, 151 (1947) (Reasonable search and seizure is not rendered
void by the fact that a whole apartment was searched). Agnello v. United States,
269 U.S. 20 (1925) (The right to search as incident to an arrest cannot extend to a
man's dwelling house several blocks distant from the place of the arrest).
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cused, whereas the search and seizure incident to a lawful arrest is not sub-
ject to any prior restraints, but is judged only on the basis of reasonableness.
Search Authorized by Special Statute
There are some exceptions to the general rule requiring a search war-
rant when the search and seizure is not conducted as incident to a lawful
arrest. The most notable of these was developed in Carrol v. United States'
as a rule of necessity during the "probihition" era. That case emphasized
the necessity of distinguishing, under the fourth amendment, the difference
between a search of a dwelling house and search of a ship, wagon, automo-
bile, or other vehicle which is highly mobile and can be readily removed
from the locality before it is possible to obtain a search warrant. Section
26 of the National Prohibition Act' provided that when any "officer shall
discover a person in the act of transporting he shall seize the liquor and ar-
rest the person in charge." A search was held to be valid even though
conducted prior to the arrest if the officer had probable cause to believe
contraband liquor was being illegally transported in the automobile. The
Court based its decision on public policy and the need for such a rule if the
laws were to be effectively enforced.
Montana enacted a similar provision in section 11073 (since repealed)
of the Revised Codes of 1921. The Montana Supreme Court in State ex rel.
Brown v. District Court" held that where search of an automobile revealed
liquor being unlawfully transported it was both the duty and right of the
officer to seize the liquor together with the vehicle and arrest the accused.
Thus the search and seizure without a warrant was held to be valid although
the defendant was not under arrest when the search was made.
In the absence of a statute authorizing such a search and seizure it
would seem that the law enforcement officers must either procure a search
warrant or make an arrest before attempting to search an automobile and
seize articles to be used against the accused.' According to a Washington
decision, when a seizure is not preceded by a search, however, and the
articles seized are contraband, the evidence is admissible although taken
without a warrant and while the accused is not under arrest. No constitu-
tional provisions are violated when the unlawful subject matter is seized
without aid of a search and is fully disclosed to the eye and open to the
hand."
-267 U.S. 132 (1924).
TAct of Oct. 28, 1919, c. 85, 41 STAT. 305.8472 Mont. 213, 232 Pac. 201 (1925).
'"State v. Ladue, 73 Mont. 535, 237 Pac. 495 (1925). The possibility should not be
foreclosed that the courts will recognize that a search of an automobile carrying
concealed weapons or narcotics and other items which are inherently dangerous will
be held to be valid because it was conducted without a warrant on the grounds of
necessity. The court might declare the search and seizure reasonable even in the
absence of a statute permitting such a search. (If the search is not prohibited as
being unreasonable it does not matter whether the officer had a warrant when he
had probable cause for believing an offense was being committed in his presence.)
"State v. Miller, 121 Wash. 153, 209 Pac. 9 (1922) ; accord, State v. Hawkins, 362
Mo. 152, 240, S.W.2d 688 (1951) ; State v. Vandetta, 108 W. Va. 277, 150 S.E. 736
(1929). Officers entered business premises to determine whether or not a tax had
been paid and the court held that they could seize illegally held slot machines,
which machines could be used against the accused. The officers were not acting
under any search warrant nor did they make an arrest; such a search and seizure
would not have been permitted If the premises had been. a dwelling house. State v.
Hoffman, 245 Wis. 367, 14 N.W.2d 146 (1944).
[Vol. 18,
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Who Can Object to Unlawful Search and Seizure
The individual whose rights have been violated by an unreasonable
search and seizure must move to suppress the evidence illegally obtained
in a direct proceeding prior to the commencement of the trial. After a
finding for the defendant, it then becomes the duty of the court to return
the articles wrongfully taken.' If the motion is not timely the remedy of
suppression is waived.' The rule is otherwise when a defendant learns for
the first time at the trial that the article was illegally obtained.' The right
to invoke the constitutional provision against an unreasonable search and
seizure is a personal one which can be raised only by the person whose
rights have been transgressed, and if the defendant disclaims ownership of
the articles he is held to have waived any rights.' Mere custody over the
article wrongfully seized is not enough to claim the right.' However, a
defendant was held to have a valid right to object to the introduction of
contraband articles into evidence when the officer seized the articles in a
friend's apartment without the friend's consent although the defendant was
absent at the time the search took place.9'
Exclusionary Rule Not Applicable to "Strangers"
Under the doctrine of Wolf v. Colorado the federal exclusionary rule
applies only to federal agents' and evidence is admissible in federal pro-
ceedings although obtained in violation of the Constitution by "strangers,"
i.e., persons not working in collusion or conjunction with federal agents."
Montana has followed the federal policy in this area and declared evidence
obtained in violation of the search and seizure provision inadmissible only
if acquired by officers or agents of the State of Montana. In State v. Gard-
ner' federal officers acting under a void federal search warrant searched
and seized the defendant's property. The state court said the evidence was
admissible whether or not it was obtained in violation of the Montana con-
stitutional prohibition. The court emphasized the fact that the state offi-
cers did not in any respect participate in or have any knowledge of the
search.
Before an officer attempts to make a doubtful search he should proceed
to the nearest magistrate and procure a warrant. This is the only way in
which the law enforcement officers can be sure of preserving the evidence
necessary to sustain a conviction. Otherwise the wrongfully obtained evi-
dence will be inadmissible and the officer will be subject to civil" and
criminal actions.-
COMPULSORY BLOOD TEST
A corollary of search and seizure and of evidence obtained thereby is
that of the admissibility of blood tests taken without consent of the accused
'State ex rel. Sarnlin v. District Court, 59 Mont. 600, 198 Pac. 362 (1921).
'State v. Gotta, 71 Mont. 288, 229 Pac. 405 (1924).
9 Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921).
'State v. Nelson, 304 P.2d 1110 (Mont. 1956).
"Kelly v. United States, 61 F.2d 843 (8th Cir. 1932).92United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951).
'Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
"Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465 (1921).
'77 Mont. 8, 249 Pac. 574 (1926) ; State ex rel. Kuhr v. District Court, 82 Mont. 515,
268 Pac. 501 (1928).
"State v. Lindway, 131 Ohio 166, 2 N.E.2d 490 (1936).
"In re Siracusa, 125 Misc. 882, 212 N.Y.S. 400 (1925). R.C.M. 1947, § 94-35-122.
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by law enforcement officers for the purpose of determining whether a driver
of an automobile is intoxicated. Can the officers require a driver to submit
to a blood test in order to obtain evidence against him?
There are three possible constitutional objections which could be raised
to such a compulsory examination. These are (1) -the privilege against self
incrimination,' (2) the prohibition against unreasonable search and seiz-
ure,' and, (3) the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.'
Privilege Against Self Incrimination
The first of these objections is clearly not applicable to the use of real
evidence (such as blood tests) but only to "testimonial compulsion."' Cases
have held that taking shoes to compare footprints,' compelling the accused
to be fingerprinted,'m and examining the defendant for identifying wounds
or scars are not within this constitutional guarantee.'
Unreasonable Search and Seizure
Involuntary submission to a physical examination for the purpose of
obtaining evidence against the accused, not under arrest, violates the con-
stitutional provision against unreasonable search and seizure.' If the ac-
cused is under arrest the blood test may be taken as incident to the arrest
without the taking constituting an unlawful search and seizure if it is other-
wise reasonable.' Certainly there is a possibility that the invasion may
be deemed unreasonable especially if the specimen is not taken by a medical
technician. In State v. Kroening,"' the officers had a blood specimen taken
from the accused without his consent, while he was unconscious but before
he had been placed under arrest, and the Wisconsin court held that the re-
sults of the test were inadmissible. It is apparent that the court would have
admitted the test if the officers had placed the accused under arrest. How-
ever, arrest nine days later caused the court to decide the taking could not
be construed to be incidental to arrest. As stated in State ex rel. Muzzy v.
Uotila,' one consenting to an unreasonable search and seizure cannot later
be heard to complain that his constitutional rights were violated because
such rights are deemed to be waived. This presents a very difficult situa-
tion since technically an unconscious defendant can neither consent nor be
placed under arrest according to the rule of Harrer v. Montgomery Ward
and Co."' The court could give a liberal construction to the phrase "inci-
dental to a lawful arrest" if the arrest were made immediately after the
defendant regained consciousness. Kansas has attempted by statute to in-
duce voluntary submision to blood tests by providing that anyone operating
a vehicle on -the public highway must consent to a chemical test of his
breath, urine, saliva, or blood or his license is suspended automatically."
"MONT. Coxsir. art. III, § 18.
"MONT. CoNST. art. III, § 7.
,'U.S. CONST.
°'State v. Fuller, 34 Mont. 12, 85 Pac. 369 (1906).
"'Id, at 25, 85 Pac. at 374.
"'United States v. Kelly, 55 F.2d 67 (2d Cir. 1932).
'"State v. Oschoa, 49 Nev. 194, 242 Pac. 582 (1926).
"'Austin & N.W.R.Co. v. Cluck, 97 Tex. 180, 77 S.W. 403 (1903).
"'State v. Kroening, 274 Wis. 266,79 N.W.2d 810 (1956).
'"'Ibid.
"71 Mont. 351, 229 Pac. 724 (1924).
'124 Mont. 295, 221 P.2d 428 (1950).
'mKAN. 0 EN. STAT. ANN. §§ 8-1001 to 8-1007 (Supp. 1965).
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Due Process Clause
The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment was invoked in
the case of Rochin v. People of Californiad " when officers took a defendant
to the hospital and a doctor used a stomach pump to obtain narcotic capsules
swallowed by the defendant. The court held that the conviction could not
be sustained upon evidence obtained by a method which "shocks the con-
science and offends the sense of justice" so as to violate the due process
clause.
Breithaupt v. Abram,' however, upheld a conviction for involuntary
manslaughter based upon the use of a blood test obtained while the defend-
ant was unconscious. The court distinguished the Rochin decision on the
grounds that the evidence in this case was not obtained by brutal or of-
fensive methods since there was no physical resistance and that the taking
of a blood sample by a doctor is a routine procedure familiar to all so as not
to shock the conscience of the community. Three justices dissented, two on
the grounds that there was no consent and there need be no physical re-
sistance to result in a violation of the due process clause. Chief Justice
Warren stated that "due process means at least that law enforcement offi-
cers in their efforts to obtain evidence from persons suspected of crime
must stop short of bruising the body, breaking the skin, puncturing tissue
or extracting body fluids, whether they contemplate doing it by force or
by stealth." Justice Douglas, dissenting, expressed the view that the
majority would have declared the taking to be in violation of the due pro-
cess clause if the defendant struggled and the officers countered with force
in order to obtain the specimen.
WIRE TAPPING
There are no Montana decisions directly on the subject of wire tapping
or the admissibility of evidence intercepted while being communicated over
telephone or telegraph lines. However, with the modern methods of com-
munications and means of interception, this is an area which will produce
litigation in the future. Officers and attorneys therefore must recognize
the possibility that necessary evidence obtained in this manner may be ex-
cluded on trial of the accused.
At common law, the offense of eavesdropping was considered an in-
vasion of privacy which would sustain a civil cause of action, but the evi-
dence obtained as a result of the eavesdropping would still be admissible
in the criminal case.' With the advent of modern devices of communica-
tion such as the telephone and telegraph, interception and recording of con-
versations became a problem. The clamor which arose because of the in-
vasion of a person's privacy by such interceptions was only aggravated by
the decision of Olmstead v. United States," in which the Supreme Court de-
cided that interception ofi a telephone conversation did not violate any con-
stitutional provisions. Neither the fourth amendment, which prohibits un-
reasonable searches and seizures, nor the fifth amendment, protecting the
accused from being compelled to be a witness against himself, was violated
-342 U.S. 165 (1951).
m77 Sup. Ct. 408 (1957).
u8 WiGMoRE, EvmmNcE § 2183 (3d ed. 1940).
"'277 U.S. 438 (1928).
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in permitting evidence obtained through wire tapping to be admitted into
evidence.
T'o remedy this inadequacy of the law, Congress in 1934 passed the
Federal Communications Act." Section 605 of this Act provided that "No
person not being authorized by the sender shall intercept any communica-
tion and divulge or publish the existence, contents, substance, purport, ef-
fect or meaning of such intercepted communication to any person.
Federal Exclusionary Rule
Shortly thereafter in Nardone v. United States" the Supreme Court in-
terpreted the phrase "no person" as set forth in section 605 of the above
act as meaning "any person," thereby em' racing federal agents and pre-
cluding them from divulging the contents of an intercepted message in fed-
eral proceedings. The second Nardone case"' broadened the scope of the
act even further when it held that evidence obtained indirectly from the use
of the intercepted message was inadmissible. Thus the "fruit of the poisoned
tree" doctrine came into existence and caused the exclusion of any evidence
tainted by wire tapping.
United States v. Guller" held that an interception is forbidden under
the Federal Communications Act when there is the interposition of a trans-
mitting apparatus, consisting of an independent receiving device, between
the lips of the sender and ear of the receiver . Earlier, use of a detecta-
phone in the next room in Goldman v. United States" was found not to fall
within the prohibition of section 605 because it was not an interception of
a message in the course of transmission.
State Courts Free to Adopt Own Rule as to Wire-Tap Evidence
What is the effect of the federal rule as to evidence obtained by wire
tapping on the state -courts? Section 605 of the Federal Communications
Act was declared to be inapplicable in the state court of Texas for the pur-
pose of excluding evidence acquired by wire tapping. The decision of
Schwartz v. Texas" stated that in absence of an expression by Congress that
the federal statute required the states to exclude evidence obtained in viola-
tion thereof, the individual states could formulate their own rule as to ad-
missibility. The court did not decide whether Congress has the power to
impose a rule of evidence upon the states in the event it desired to do so.
The possibility that statutory extension in the future will prohibit the use
of wire-tap evidence in the state courts has thus not been extinguished.
Weiss v. United States' involved a federal proceeding which charged the
defendant with conspiracy and use of the mails to defraud. The court held
that section 605 was applicable in federal courts to an intrastate intercep-
tion as well as an interstate interception. The decision was based on the
broad power which exists under the commerce clause when intrastate trans-
actions affect interstate commerce.
'48 STAT. 1064 (1934), 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1954).
116302 U.S. 379 (1937).
"'Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939).
11101 F. Supp. 176 (E.D. Pa. 1951).
"1316 U.S. 129 (1942).
1°344 U.S. 199 (1952).
"308 U.S. 321 (1939).
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As stated previously the state courts are free to adopt their own rules
as to wire-tap evidence and may therefore follow the provisions of section
605. California decisions have many times discussed the applicability of
section 605 but have never given a decisive answer as to whether wire-tap
evidence will be excluded because it was obtained in violation of the federal
statute.'o That section may be of increased importance today in view of a
recent decision' in which the California Court decided to follow the federal
exclusionary rule for evidence obtained illegally. In that case the police of-
ficers broke into the defendant's home and installed microphones and de-
vices to record telephone conversations. The court, without mentioning the
Federal Communications Act, held that such methods of obtaining evidence
violated the constitutional provision against unreasonable search and seiz-
ure. The majority applied the constitutional provision to the breaking and
entering of the house to obtain the evidence. However, state courts are
still free in establishing their policy to interpret their constitutional provi-
sions against unreasonable search and seizure so as to include wire tapping.
Wire-Tap Evidence in Montana
Montana courts have been confronted with the question of admissibility
of evidence obtained by wire tapping only indirectly. In State v. Porter'
recordings of telephone conversations were attempted to be introduced be-
fore the court for impeachment purposes. The offers of proof showed that
the recordings were obtained in compliance with the rules of the Montana
Public Service Commission and did not violate any Montana statutes. The
prosecuting counsel objected to the introduction of these recordings on the
ground that the federal statutes were violated. The court found nothing in
the record to indicate that any state or federal statute had been violated in
acquiring this information and held it was improper for the lower court to
refuse the admission of such evidence. When a clear test case arises Mon-
tana has three statutes which may be construed as forbidding disclosure of
such evidence in court proceedings. The first of these is section 94-3203
which provides:
Any person who wilfully and maliciously displaces, removes, in-
jures, destroys or obstructs any telegraph, telephone or electric
light line, wire, cable, pole or conduit belonging to another, or the
material or property appurtenant thereto, or maliciously and wil-
fully cuts, breaks, taps, or makes any connection with any tele-
graph or telephone line, wire, cable, or instrument belonging to an-
other, or maliciously and wilfully reads, takes or copies any mes-
sages, communication or report intended for another passing over
any such telegraph or telephone line, wire, or cable, in this state,
or who wilfully and maliciously prevents, obstructs or delays by
any means or contrivance whatsoever the sending, transmission,
conveyance or delivery in this state of any message, communication
or report by or through any telegraph or telephone line, wire or
cable or who uses any apparatus to unlawfully do or cause to be
done any of the acts hereinbefore mentioned . . .shall be deemed
guilty of a misdemeanor. ...
At first glance the above statute appears to have been enacted to protect
"People v. Malotte, 46 Cal. 2d 59, 292 P.2d 517 (1956).
'People v. Cahan, 141 Cal. App. 2d 891, 297 P.2d 715 (1955).2125 Mont. 503, 242 P.2d 984 (1952).
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the public communication systems. However, evidence may be declared
inadmissible under the exclusionary rule.
Another statute, which was enacted for the express purpose of curtail-
ing wire tapping, is section 94-35-220:
Every person who, by means of any machine, instrument, or con-
trivance, or in any other manner, wilfully and fraudulently reads,
or attempts to read, any message, or learn the contents thereof,
while the same is being sent over any telegraph line, or wilfully
and fraudulently, or clandestinely, learns or attempts to learn the
contents or meaning of any message, whilst the same is in any
telegraph office, or is being received thereat or sent therefrom, or
who uses or attempts to use, or communicates to others, any infor-
mation so obtained, is punishable ...
Section 94-3321 would seem to give the courts authority to exclude all evi-
dence obtained as a result of wire tapping. This statute provides:
Every person who wilfully discloses the contents of a telegraphic
message, or any part thereof, addressed to another person without
the permission of such person, unless directed so to do by the law-
ful order of a court, is punishable by imprisonment in the state
prison not exceeding five years, or in the county jail not exceeding
one year, or by fine not exceeding five thousand dollars, or by both
fine and imprisonment. (Emphasis added.)
Sections 94-35-220 and 94-3321 have not been amended since 1895 when
they were first enacted to prevent persons from divulging the contents of
telegraph messages, and the courts of Montana may follow the lead of Cali-
fornia and hold that these statutes should be construed to include "tele-
phone line" and "telephone message" respectively.' The California Court
determined that the rule of strict construction as applied at the common
law was not meant to apply to a situation like that presented. A similar
result might be achieved in Montana either because the application is
remedial and not penal, or under section 94-101, which provides:
The rule of the common law, that penal statutes are to be strictly
construed, has no application to this code. All its provisions are
to be construed according to the fair import of their terms, with a
view to effect its object and to promote justice.
In light of the above statutes, it seems that the Supreme Court of Montana
could exclude evidence obtained by wire tapping.
Section 94-3321 could be construed, however, to authorize the courts to
issue ex parte orders allowing police officers to obtain evidence by wire
tapping when the officers can show the court that they have reasonable
grounds to believe that evidence of a crime can be obtained. Further, it is
submitted that the statutes by their very terms ma be interpreted as not
encompassing wire tapping activities of the law enforcement officers. Sec-
tion 94-3203 lists the elements of "wilfully and maliciously" which must be
proved before a conviction can be had under that section. Likewise sections
94-35-220 and 94-3321 respectively establish "fraud" and "wilfully" as
necessary elements of the crime. It cannot be said that police officers act-
ing in their official capacity usually come within the prohibition of the
above statutes if these words are given their normal meaning.
RAE V. KALBFLEISCH
'Davis v. Pacific Telephonel Co., 127 Cal. 312, 59 Pac. 698 (1899).
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